Ryle on Motives and Dispositions by Alvarez, Maria
		 1	
This is a pre-print of a paper published in Ryle on Mind and Language, D. Dolby (ed.). 
(2015), Palgrave, pp. 74-96 
 
 
 
Ryle on Motives and Dispositions 
 
Introduction 
In The Concept of Mind, Ryle discusses dispositions in some detail both in the chapter on 
emotions, especially in relation to the concept of motive and, of course, in the chapter entitled 
‘Dispositions and Occurrences’. These discussions show that he regarded the dispositional 
concepts as central to a proper understanding of the mind and of behaviour. He held that 
‘many of the cardinal concepts in terms of which we describe specifically human behaviour 
are dispositional concepts’ (117) and he also thought that ‘the vogue of the para-mechanical 
legend has led many people to ignore the ways in which these concepts actually behave and to 
construe them instead as items in the description of occult causes and effects’ (ibid). In other 
words, Ryle thought that ‘the official doctrine’ about the mind (see CM, 11ff.) tends to treat 
these psychological terms as ‘episodic words’ denoting occurrences, or as terms used to report 
‘particular but unwitnessable matters of fact’ (117),1 when in fact they express dispositional 
concepts. Moreover, according to the official doctrine, these occurrences are causes of 
behaviour, albeit ones that are not accessible for public inspection – hence the ‘para-
mechanical’ label. Much of the discussion in the two chapters mentioned above is devoted to 
bringing out the logico-grammatical features of these mental dispositional concepts in order 
to show how ill-suited they are to play the role of cause in the production of behaviour that 
the official doctrine traditionally ascribes to them. 
Chief among the dispositional concepts in terms of which we describe and explain human 
behaviour, Ryle thinks, are motives (others such concepts are habits, attitudes, instincts, etc.). 
And a central claim in The Concept of Mind is that ‘to explain an action as done from a 
specified motive is not to describe the action as the effect of a specified cause’ (113). The 
reasoning behind this claim will be examined below but it depends crucially on three 
doctrines held by Ryle: the first is that motives are dispositions; the second is that the cause of 
an event is a happening or occurrence, that is, another event or, perhaps, a process; and the 
third is that the explanation of an occurrence by reference to a disposition is not a causal 
explanation at least not if by causal explanation one means an explanation that refers to some 
event, state or condition. I shall examine these doctrines in turn in the next two sections.  
My aim in this paper is to tease out and assess Ryle’s position on the relationship between 
motives and actions, in particular his claim that this relation is not causal and that, therefore, 
the corresponding explanations are not causal explanations. I shall argue that, although Ryle 
mistakenly assimilated explanations by motives to explanations by character traits, he 
nonetheless has much of interest to say about how motives and character traits are related to 
the actions they explain, respectively, and also about whether we should think of explanations 
of either kind as causal explanations. 
 																																																								
1 By ‘reports of matters of fact’ Ryle seems to mean reports of actual events, processes and states of affairs but 
he excludes from these attributions of (actual) abilities, liabilities, capacities, etc. Thus Ryle says that when 
inquiring about the mental factors that explain action, ‘our inquiry is not into causes (and a fortiori not into 
occult causes), but into capacities, skills, habits, liabilities and bents’ (45). 
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1. Motives and Dispositions 
In chapter 5 of The Concept of Mind, Ryle characterises motives as dispositions.2 And, as is 
well known, he says that the way to understand dispositions is to focus on the logic of 
dispositional statements, which he took to be captured by law-like statements. Famously, he 
thought of dispositional statements as ‘inference tickets’ which enable their ‘holders’ to 
‘predict, retrodict, explain and modify the actions, reactions and states’ (124) of the thing that 
has the disposition mentioned in the statement. 
Because he thought of motives as dispositions, and thought that the logic of the latter is 
captured by law-like statements, Ryle says that a statement that gives someone’s motive for 
acting is to be understood by reference to such law-like statements: ‘The expansion of a 
motive-expression is a law-like sentence and not a report of an event’ (113). And he adds that, 
for example, the statement that a man boasted from vanity should be construed not as ‘he 
boasted and the cause of his boasting was the occurrence in him of a particular feeling or 
impulse of vanity’ (89) but, rather, as 
He boasted and his doing so satisfies the law-like proposition that whenever he finds a 
chance of securing the admiration and envy of others, he does whatever he thinks will 
produce the admiration and envy of others (Ibid). 
While Ryle’s negative claim about how to construe motive statements may be plausible, his 
positive claim is problematic. His proposal has been criticized on the grounds that it implies 
that it is not possible to act out of a motive, such as vanity or greed, only once – which is 
clearly false:3 a person can act out of vanity or greed once or twice without being a vain or 
greedy person. 
This is a fairly obvious point – so we might wonder why Ryle overlooked it and thought that 
an inquiry into someone’s motive for acting on a particular occasion is ‘an inquiry into the 
character of the agent which accounts for his having acted in that way on that occasion’ (89). 
One reason for his holding this view seems to be the thought that, in general, one of the most 
reliable clues to what someone’s motive was on a particular occasion is their character. He 
writes: 
We should consider by what tests we should try to decide a dispute about the motive 
from which a person had done something; did he, for example, throw up a well-paid 
post for a relatively humble Government job from patriotism or from a desire to be 
exempt from military service? We begin, perhaps, by asking him; but on this sort of 
matter his avowals, to us or to himself, would very likely not be frank. We next try, 																																																								2	Here are some remarks of Ryle’s to that effect (italics all mine): ‘When we ask 'Why did  someone act in a 
certain way?’ [we are making] ‘an inquiry into the character of the agent which accounts for his having acted in 
that way on that occasion’(89); ‘to ask whether an action was done from force of habit or from kindliness of 
heart is therefore to ask which of two specified dispositions is the explanation of the action’(92); ‘to explain an 
action as done from a certain motive is not to correlate it with an occult cause, but to subsume it under a 
propensity or behaviour-trend’ (110); ‘in ascribing a specific motive to a person we are describing the sorts of 
things that he tends to try to do or bring about’ (112; see also p.113 quoted above). 
3 See, e.g. Anscombe (1957: 21). Wilkins (1963) claims that Anscombe’s criticism fails because it depends on 
attributing to Ryle the view that a vain person must ‘always or very often’ act vainly. But, Wilkins says, this is to 
misunderstand Ryle’s remarks about dispositions and laws, since ‘law-like propositions about how a person 
behaves when in certain situations do not imply propositions about the frequency with which a person does in 
fact behave in certain ways’ (Wilkins 1963, 112). But this defence is simply off-target because Anscombe’s 
objection is not that a man must act out of vanity very frequently to be a vain man but rather that a man may act 
out of vanity once without thereby being a vain man (i.e. without having a disposition to act vainly); but Ryle’s 
construal of motive statements seems to exclude this possibility. 
		 3	
not necessarily unsuccessfully, to settle the dispute by considering whether his words, 
actions, embarrassments, etc., on this and other occasions square with the hypothesis 
that he is physically timorous and averse from regimentation, or whether they square 
with the hypothesis that he is relatively indifferent to money and would sacrifice 
anything to help win the war. We try, that is, to settle by induction the relevant traits 
in his character (92). 
But the importance of character traits as clues for establishing someone’s motives does not 
sanction the conclusion that someone’s motive on any one occasion must be a character trait 
of theirs – for at least two reasons. First, attributions of character traits depend conceptually 
on attributions of the corresponding motives to that person on particular occasions. What this 
means is that being motivated in the relevant way at least some times is part of what it is to 
have the corresponding character trait: only someone who has been motivated by generosity 
on a sufficient number of occasions is a generous person.4 This is not simply a point about 
how we discover or decide whether someone is a generous person; it is about what it is to be a 
generous person (more on this in section 3 below). And so it must be possible to impute the 
motive (vanity, generosity) without thereby (yet) attributing the character trait to the person; 
and moreover, the character trait is attributed on the basis of imputing the motive, and not 
vice-versa. Ryle himself makes a similar point in the following passage: 
The tendency to ruminate and the habit of cigarette-smoking could not exist, unless 
there were such processes or episodes as ruminating and smoking cigarettes. ‘He is 
smoking a cigarette now’ does not say the same sort of thing as ‘he is a cigarette-
smoker’, but unless statements like the first were sometimes true, statements like the 
second could not be true (119; see also p.85). 
In the second sentence of this paragraph Ryle seems to be saying that the presence of certain 
tendencies, dispositions, habits, etc., in a thing depends logically on the occurrence of the 
corresponding episodes. And just ‘A is smoking a cigarette’ does not say the same thing as  
‘A is a smoker’, saying ‘A acted vainly’ is not the same thing as saying ‘A is a vain person’. 
And conversely, unless A is motivated by vanity from time to time she cannot be said to be a 
vain person. 
The second reason why motive explanations of action cannot be attributions of dispositional 
character traits is the mirror image of the first: although character traits are good clues to 
people’s motives, they are not decisive in establishing someone’s motive on a particular 
occasion because people can and do act out of character; that is, they occasionally act 
motivated by things that do not normally motivate them, and occasionally are not motivated 
by the things that normally motivate them. Both these considerations suggest that a motive is 
not in itself a disposition, and a fortiori, not a character trait. 
A.R. White successfully identifies the cause of this blind spot in Ryle’s understanding of 
motive statements. As White points out, the problem arises because Ryle conflates the 
concept of a motive with the things that can be motives; that is, he makes a ‘category mistake’ 
in supposing that 
a motive is, to use a vague word, some kind of thing; that motives are of the same 
general type as moods, agitations, habits, reflexes, traits, attitudes (…) (White,1958, 																																																								
4 This is consistent with the fact that, in certain cases, because of the nature or circumstances of the action, 
imputing a motive on a particular occasion might be enough to impute the character trait to the person – still in 
these cases it would be true that the character trait is attributed on the basis of the imputation of the motive and 
not vice-versa. 
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258). 
But, as White goes on to say, to ask for the motive for an action is not to ask for one thing 
among a person’s moods, habits, or character traits that may contribute to explain that action 
but rather it is to ask for a certain kind of explanation for that action. (I shall return below, at 
the end of this section, to White’s claim that motives are ‘not kinds of things which feature in 
our explanations of human conduct’ but are, rather ‘kinds of explanation’ of human conduct 
(1958, 259) making use of an idea of Anthony Kenny’s that motive explanations work by 
bringing the agent’s desires, goals, beliefs, etc. and behaviour under familiar patterns, and that 
motive terms (‘ambition’, ‘jealousy’, ‘generosity’, etc.) are precisely names for such 
patterns.)5  
So Ryle may be right that vanity is a character trait that involves a tendency to act in ways 
that fall under the kind of law-like proposition he suggests, and be right also that vanity can 
be a motive. But he is wrong to say that the motive of vanity that leads someone to do 
something is a disposition (viz. to do vain things). The point may be seen clearly if one 
considers the difference between explaining an action by reference to a character trait of the 
agent’s and explaining it by reference to his motive, even when the thing that is the motive in 
the second case is also a character trait in the agent. So consider the difference between 
saying that John joined the tennis club because he’s very ambitious and saying that his motive 
in joining the club was ambition. In the first case, we do two things: we explain John’s action 
by reference to a motive and also say that his action manifests a character trait of John’s (a 
disposition): we say both that John’s motive on this occasion was ambition (he did it out of a 
desire to get ahead) and also that John tends to be motivated by ambition. But the second 
explanation, which simply gives John’s motive, says only that he joined the club in order to 
get ahead, without imputing to him ambition as a character trait. As Ryle himself notes, to say 
‘that a certain motive is a trait in someone’s character is to say that he is inclined to do certain 
sorts of things, make certain sorts of plans, indulge in certain sorts of daydreams …’ (1949: 
90). But, to repeat, the reverse is not true: to say that someone acted out of a motive is not to 
say that that motive is a trait in his character, so it is not to say that he is generally inclined to 
do certain kinds of things, etc. 
So motives are not dispositions, although something that is a character trait, which is a kind of 
disposition, can also be the motive for an action. For instance, a person who is compassionate 
tends to be motivated by compassion and, so, on particular occasions, his motive for acting 
will be compassion: he will be moved to act in ways he thinks will help those in need by his 
sympathy for their plight. But if so, his motive on any of those occasions will be compassion 
and not a disposition to be compassionate. 
Thus, although Ryle is right that motives are not occurrences, acts, performances, events, 
states, etc., that is not because they are dispositions, and so he is wrong to think that the logic 
(or logics) of dispositional statements gives the logic of motives. And, therefore, and to return 
to the construal of the statement ‘He boasted from vanity’, we might accept Ryle’s contention 
that this statement carries no implication of the occurrence in the man of a particular feeling 
or impulse or ‘psychological episode’ of vanity which might be said to be the cause of his 
boasting. But we need not accept that it carries instead an implication that his boasting was 
the manifestation of a general disposition to say things that he believes are likely to secure the 
admiration and envy of others when the occasion arises, nor need we accept the related claim 
that motives are dispositions. 																																																								
5 Kenny, 1989, 59ff.. 
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If this is right, if motives are not dispositions or occurrences and not, as White puts it, ‘some 
kind of thing’, what are they? I mentioned above White’s remark that motives, far from being 
elements in the explanation of action are ‘kinds of explanation’. And I want to explore that 
suggestion now. I will do so by examining some things Ryle says about the distinction 
between acting out of habit and acting out of a motive. 
Ryle thinks that the two classes of action (those done out of habit and motive) are importantly 
different, even though both are explained by being subsumed ‘under a propensity or 
behaviour-trend’ (110; which he thinks is true also of reflex and instinctive actions).6 
According to him, actions done out of a motive are characterized, by contrast to those done 
out of habit, because in them the agent acts ‘more or less carefully, critically, consistently and 
purposefully’ (111). Ryle goes on to add that these adverbs do not signify  
the prior or concomitant occurrence of extra operations of resolving, planning or 
cogitating, but only that the action taken is itself  done not absent-mindedly but in a 
certain positive frame  of mind. (…) In short, the class of actions done from motives 
coincides with the class of actions describable as more or less intelligent (111). 
These remarks capture a feature that is indeed defining of acting for a motive, namely that the 
agent acts purposefully and for a reason; that is, in order to achieve some end and in light of, 
or guided, by certain facts. This is supported by the logic of motive statements.  
I said above that, contrary to what Rule says, motive statements do not imply that the action 
explained was a manifestation of a character trait of the agent’s. But what such statements do 
imply is both that the agent had an aim or goal in acting as she did, and that she believed and 
perhaps knew that her acting so was, in some more or less direct way, conducive to achieving 
that aim. So, to go back to Ryle’s example, the statement ‘He boasted from vanity’ implies, 
not that he always or often seeks to secure the admiration and envy of others when the right 
occasion arises but that, on this occasion, his aim in saying what he did was to secure the 
admiration and envy of others and that he believed that his boasts would or at least might do 
so.7 
So we might say, again following White, that to give the motive for an action is to give the 
desire or value for the sake of which the action was done (the agent’s goal or aim in acting), 
and, I would add, it is also to implicitly attribute some belief to the agent, namely that acting 
as he did was conducive to satisfying the desire or realizing the value. Thus, in knowing the 
motive why someone acted we know both the desire for the sake of which the action was 
done and his reason for acting – though neither his aim nor his reason need be explicit and 
																																																								6	Though Ryle notes that the two classes of actions, viz. those done out of habit and those done for a motive, are 
not ‘demarcated from one another as an equatorial day from an equatorial night. They shade into one another as 
an English day shades into an English night’ (110).	 
7 Davidson makes a similar point in his defence of the claim that actions are explained in the first instance by 
citing a ‘primary reason’. He notes that Ryle’s  
analysis is often, and perhaps justly, criticized on the ground that a man may boast from vanity just 
once. But if Ryle's boaster did what he did from vanity, then something entailed by Ryle's analysis is 
true: the boaster wanted to secure the admiration and envy of others, and he believed that his action 
would produce this admiration and envy; true or false, Ryle’s analysis does not dispense with primary 
reasons, but depends upon them (689). 
As is well known, Davidson thinks of a primary reason for an action as a combination of two mental states of an 
agent’s: a pro-attitude and a belief, that together explain the action by giving the agent’s reason for doing what 
he did.  
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fully conscious.8 But to say that is not to say that motives are desires or agent’s reasons – 
even though in giving an agent’s reason, or the desire from which he acted, we may give 
(sometimes implicitly) the agent’s motive for acting.9 
Motives are then best thought of as explanatory patterns under which we can bring intentional 
behaviour and the goals and beliefs or knowledge that prompted and guided that behaviour, so 
that these are related to each other in intelligible and familiar ways. Thus, behaviour 
motivated by revenge corresponds to a pattern relating a desire to harm someone on the 
grounds that that person has caused some harm to oneself (or one’s family, group, country, 
etc.) and a belief that the proposed action will be harmful. Acting out of revenge is acting in 
order to harm someone because of that previous (real or perceived) harm caused by the 
victim of revenge, and of a belief that the proposed action will be suitably harmful. The 
suggestion that motives are pattern-concepts under which we bring goals, beliefs or 
knowledge, and intentional behaviour in order to explain the latter gives substance to White’s 
remark that motives are not items in the explanation of intentional actions but rather kinds of 
explanation of those actions.10  
I shall leave here my examination of Ryle’s doctrine that motives are dispositions and turn 
now to the second and third doctrines mentioned in the introduction, namely, that the cause of 
an event is a happening or occurrence, and that dispositions are not causes of their 
manifestations (and, relatedly, that explanations of events that cite a disposition are not causal 
explanations). 
 
2. Causes, Occurrences and Dispositions 
Ryle’s causal doctrine is expressed in this passage: 
I have argued that to explain an action as done from a specified motive or inclination 
is not to describe the action as the effect of a specified cause. Motives are not 
happenings and are not therefore of the right type to be causes (113). 
Here Ryle seems to subscribe to the view, which was beginning to gain popularity at the time 
of the publication of The Concept of Mind, that an agent’s motive for acting, and generally an 
agent’s reason for acting, are not the causes of his action.11 
Anyone familiar with the debates on intentional action that have dominated the literature 
since the 1960s will, on reading Ryle’s remarks above, think immediately of Davidson’s 
arguments in his paper ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’. In that paper, Davidson famously 																																																								
8 I am using ‘the agent’s reason’ to mean the reason in light of which the agent acts, and not just any reason that 
could explain why the agent acted as she did. The former might be a premise in the agent’s practical reasoning, 
and what she might give as part of her justification in answering the question why she acted (these may be what I 
have elsewhere called ‘merely apparent reasons’). For a clarification of the issues involved in these distinctions, 
see Alvarez, 2010, ch.5. 
9 I say ‘sometimes implicitly’ because the same reason may be compatible with different motives. Thus, if A’s 
reason for giving B a lethal overdose is that B has a painful chronic condition, A’s motive in so acting may be 
compassion (if his aim was to alleviate B’s suffering) or greed (if A’s aim was to ensure that her inheritance 
wasn’t used up on B’s care). I discuss these issues in Alvarez, 2010, §3.1. 
10 As I say above, this suggestion is inspired by Kenny’s discussion of motives in Kenny, 1989, 59ff..  
11 Ryle talks about motives while other participants in the debate about action explanations, e.g. Davidson, talk 
about the agent’s reason. In the previous section I mentioned some differences between these concepts as well as 
some ways in which they are related. Nonetheless, those differences can be ignored for the purposes of the issues 
at hand – not least because, as Davidson notes (see fn. 7 above), talk of motives implies talk of (primary) 
reasons. 
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outlines and defends a causal doctrine about the relation between reasons and actions, namely:  
C2. A primary reason for an action is its cause (692).  
In his defence of this doctrine, Davison considers several objections, one of which is worded 
in ways that closely echo Ryle’s remark above.12 The objection is that a primary reason 
‘consist of attitudes and beliefs, which are states or dispositions, not events; therefore they 
cannot be causes’ (1963, 693. As we have seen, Ryle did not think that motives were states 
but he certainly thought they were dispositions and hence, he thought, not causes). 
Davidson’s reply to the objection is well known:   
It is easy to reply that states, dispositions, and conditions are frequently named as the 
causes of events: the bridge collapsed because of a structural defect; the plane crashed 
on takeoff because the air temperature was abnormally high; the plate broke because it 
had a crack (694). 
One might object that, as a matter of fact, the statements Davidson gives in his reply do not 
name any state, disposition or condition as ‘the cause’ of an event: rather they are ‘because’-
statements that mention states, dispositions or conditions in order to explain of the occurrence 
of events. But Davidson’s claim is, precisely, that these ‘because’-statements are causal: the 
states, dispositions or conditions they mention are causes of events–or more accurately, since 
Davidson also thought that only events are causes, causal factors or conditions, and therefore 
the because-statements provide causal explanations of the events they explain. Davidson goes 
on to say that this reply works on the assumption that there was always a suitable triggering 
event which is ‘the cause’ event – a claim that some of the philosophers Davidson was 
arguing against denied, at least in relation to human behaviour but which, as we shall see, 
Ryle is happy to accept. 
So it might seem that Ryle’s views on whether motives are causes of actions is diametrically 
opposed to Davidson’s and, moreover, that Ryle’s grounds for saying that motives are not 
causes (cited at the beginning of this section) are defeated by Davidson’s response. However, 
consideration of other things Ryle says in The Concept of Mind suggests, rather, that his 
picture of the explanation of action by motives is in fact not so very different from 
Davidson’s. For, having said that motives explain actions as dispositions explain their 
manifestations, Ryle adds: 
But the general fact that a person is disposed to act in such and such ways in such and 
such circumstances does not by itself account for his doing a particular thing at a 
particular moment; any more than the fact that the glass was brittle accounts for its 
fracture at 10 p.m. As the impact of the stone at 10 p.m. caused the glass to break, so 
some antecedent of an action causes or occasions the agent to perform it when and 
where he does so (113. My italics). 
Indeed, in order to understand Ryle’s claims about motives, causation and explanation, it is 
important to pay attention to a distinction he makes between two kinds of explanation. 
According to him, there are two different senses in which we explain why something 
occurred. First, there is the ‘causal sense’ in which we explain that the glass broke because a 
stone hit it. This ‘because’-clause reports an event, the stone’s striking of the window, which 
stands ‘to the fracture of the glass as cause to effect’ (88). But, he adds,  																																																								
12 Davidson mentions Ryle explicitly in connection not with this but with the objection to the causal theory that 
holds that ‘a reason for an action is not logically distinct from the action; therefore, reasons are not causes of 
actions’, about which, Davidson says: ‘In one of its forms, the argument was of course inspired by Ryle’s 
treatment of motives in The Concept of Mind’ (1963, 695 & fn.6) though he does not specify where.   
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very frequently we look for and get explanations of occurrences in another sense of 
‘explanation’. We ask why the glass shivered when struck by the stone and we get the 
answer that it was because the glass was brittle. Now ‘brittle’ is a dispositional 
adjective (…). So when we say that the glass broke when struck because it was brittle, 
the ‘because’ clause does not report a happening or a cause; it states a law-like 
proposition (88-9). 
Davidsons could reply to this by saying that what Ryle calls ‘two senses’ in which an event is 
explained (‘The glass broke because it was fragile’ and ‘The glass broke because the stone hit 
it’) are really two parts of the same causal explanation.13 One gives a causal condition for the 
occurrence of the breaking, while the other gives the (trigger) event that stands to the breaking 
in the extensional relation of cause-event to effect-event. But even so, he seems to agree with 
Ryle that what we explain when we cite a cause-event is why something happened when it 
did, or why someone did what they did when they did it, for he writes:   
The signaling driver can answer the question ‘Why did you raise your arm when you 
did?’, and from the answer we learn the event that caused the action. But can an actor 
always answer such a question? Sometimes the answer will mention a mental event 
that does not give a reason: ‘Finally I made up my mind’.14 However, there also seem 
to be cases of intentional action where we cannot explain at all why we acted when we 
did. In such cases, explanation in terms of primary reasons parallels the explanation of 
the collapse of the bridge from a structural defect: we are ignorant of the event or 
sequence of events that led up to (caused) the collapse, but we are sure there was such 
an event or sequence of events (695. My italics). 
So both Ryle and Davidson agree that explaining why something happened when it did 
requires citing the event (the ‘cause’ event) that triggered the causal process that culminated 
in the effect event, while explaining why something happened at all does not require 
mentioning the trigger, although it implies that there was such a trigger. 
It may seem, then, that the difference between Ryle and Davidson on the question whether 
explanations of action that cite motives (or reasons generally) are causal is no more than 
presentational. After all, Davidson agrees with Ryle that only events (or occurrences) are 
causes; other things, such as states, dispositions or conditions are not properly speaking 
causes (for Davidson they are causal factors or causal conditions). And Ryle agrees with 
Davidson that when we explain why something happened by reference to a disposition, 
although we are not thereby citing a cause-event that explains why that thing happened when 
it did, we do nonetheless imply that there was such an event or sequence of events that was 
the cause of the happening and explains why it occurred then. Thus, Ryle says that ‘an 
action’s having a cause does not conflict with its having a motive, but is already prescribed 
for in the protasis of the hypothetical proposition which states the motive’ (114). To that 
extent, then, Ryle was not one of those philosophers who, in Davidson’s words, felt ‘a certain 																																																								
13 But consider Davidson’s remark that 
The most primitive explanation of an event gives its cause; more elaborate explanations may tell more 
of the story, or defend the singular causal claim by producing a relevant law or by giving reasons for 
believing such exists (698). 
14 Note that, contrary to what Davison implies, an explanation of why someone acted when he did does not give 
the agent’s reason for doing what he did but only either the reason why he did it, or his reason for doing it then: 
‘I raised up my arm then because I noticed the turning coming up’ does not tell us the agent’s reason for raising 
his arm (presumably, that he was signaling), but the reason why he raised it when he did (that he noticed the 
turning). Likewise, ‘I signaled because I saw the turning’ does not tell us the agent’s reason for signaling but his 
reason for signaling then. Admittedly, in both cases we can easily infer the agent’s reason for acting. 
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uneasiness’ in ‘speaking of causes of actions at all’ (700). 
All this notwithstanding, an important difference remains – a difference about their respective 
conceptions of dispositions. For, although Ryle is happy to accept that actions have (event) 
causes, he would not accept Davidson’s claim that reasons or motives are ‘causal conditions’ 
of actions, at least not in the sense Davidson intends that claim. This is because Ryle rejected 
the view that dispositions are causal conditions in the sense of being events or states or 
anything of the kind – that is, anything that can be said to happen or exist or obtain, to be 
overt or hidden, seen or unseen. According to him, dispositions are not of the right logical 
type to fit such attributes: 
To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a 
particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a 
particular change, when a particular condition is realised (43). 
Thus, one of the things that Ryle is at pains to deny in The Concept of Mind is that, when we 
explain an occurrence by reference to a disposition, we are explaining by citing some thing – 
some object, event, state, etc., some ‘unobservable existence’ – that is the disposition and that 
is ‘causally efficacious’ in bringing about that occurrence. Consider his remarks about the 
concept of a causal connection: 
Now there is no objection to employing the familiar idiom ‘causal connection’. 
Bacteriologists do discover causal connections between bacteria and diseases, since 
this is only another way of saying that they do establish laws and so provide 
themselves with inference tickets which enable them to infer from diseases to bacteria, 
explain diseases by assertions about bacteria, prevent and cure diseases by eliminating 
bacteria, and so forth.  But to speak as if the discovery of a law were the finding of a 
third, unobservable existence is simply to fall back into the old habit of construing 
open hypothetical statements as singular categorical statements (122). 
Similarly, he might add, there is no objection to saying that there is a causal connection 
between someone’s motive (which, remember, Ryle thinks of as a disposition) and their 
action – but for Ryle that is just another way of saying that we have identified a law-like 
regularity and thus provided ourselves with an inference ticket that enables us to predict, 
explain, retrodict, prevent, etc. that person’s actions. 
Thus, Ryle’s second ground for his anti-causal understanding of the relation between motives 
and actions is his conception of dispositions. For Ryle, motives, which fall under what he 
calls ‘higher mental dispositional concepts’ aren’t causal conditions (in Davidson’s sense) of 
the actions they explain, simply because they are dispositions. 15 To be sure, they are 
dispositions of a special kind, but this is not because they are mental, it is because they are not 
‘single-track dispositions, but dispositions the exercises of which are indefinitely 
heterogeneous’ (44). Motives are, Ryle thinks, not like the dispositional concept ‘fragile’, 
whose manifestation is single track (i.e. ‘determinate’): shattering; but rather like the 
dispositional concept ‘elastic’ whose manifestation can take many forms (i.e. ‘determinable’ 
(118)): expanding, contracting, etc.):16 
When Jane Austen wished to show the specific kind of pride which characterised the 
heroine of ‘Pride and Prejudice’, she had to represent her actions, words, thoughts and 
feelings in a thousand different situations. There is no one standard type of action or 																																																								
15 By ‘higher mental concepts’ Ryle means concepts whose employment indicates the presence of intelligence. 
16 For a criticism of this distinction of Ryle’s see Lyons, 1973.  
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reaction such that Jane Austen could say ‘My heroine’s kind of pride was just the 
tendency to do this, whenever a situation of that sort arose’ (ibid). 
In sum, what leads Ryle to reject the doctrine that motives are causal conditions in 
Davidson’s sense is not a behaviourist tendency to deny the reality of the mental, but rather 
his view that motives are a particular kind of disposition, and his general conception of 
dispositions.17 And this is an important issue on which he disagrees with Davidson, because 
for Ryle motives, being dispositions, are not things of any kind and hence not, for example, 
states that could play a causal role and have various descriptions. It is this view of 
dispositions, coupled with his belief that motives are dispositions, that makes motives ill-
suited to play the role of causal factors, as Davidson suggests they do in ‘Actions, Reasons 
and Causes’. And it follows that Ryle could not accept Davidson’s view that explanations by 
reference to the agent’s reasons or motives are explanations that use psychological vocabulary 
to describe particular events and states that could also be picked out using the vocabulary of 
the physical sciences (see, for instance, CoM, 117).	
We have seen, then, that Ryle denies that motives are causes of actions and that explanations 
citing motives are causal explanations on two grounds. One is that he thinks that causes 
proper are happenings (events or processes) and since motives are not happenings, they are 
not in the right category to be causes.	The second is that he thinks that motives are 
dispositions and that dispositions are not causal conditions in the sense of being states that 
play a causal role. And we have seen that, although Davidson would agree with the first claim 
(for he also thought that causes, strictly speaking, are events), he would disagree with the 
second. And so it becomes clear that, in fact, the more significant disagreement between 
Davidson and Ryle on the relation between motives or reasons and actions does not depend 
on the doctrine, held by other anti-causalists among Davidson’s targets, that intentional 
actions do not have causes but rather on their different views about dispositions in general.	
It should be noted that Ryle’s view of dispositions, though greatly influential, has been 
criticised on several grounds. First, he is associated with the view that dispositions can be 
analysed in terms of conditional statements. Whether he held that dispositional statements are 
susceptible to this sort of analysis may be debatable but it is clear that he thought that ‘to say 
that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at 
any time and in any parcel of water’ (124). However, the ‘simple conditional’ analysis of 
dispositional concepts came under sustained attack in the 1990s. Arguments that point to the 
possibilities of ‘finked’, ‘masked’ and ‘mimicked’ dispositions, developed by several 
philosophers, show that the simple conditional analysis provides neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for something to have a disposition.18 Since then, there have been 
different attempts to provide more complex conditional analyses of dispositions that avoid the 
problems faced by the simple view but there seems to be consensus that the simple 
																																																								
17 Julia Tanney argues that Ryle’s ‘anti-causalist’ position arises not from his views about the mind, e.g. from his 
alleged behaviourism, or from the ‘logical connection’ argument (which says that the alleged mental occurrences 
that are claimed to cause actions are ‘logically’ connected to actions and hence not suited to be their causes). 
Rather, according to her, Ryle’s argument is that  
the existence of such [mental] occurrences is not required for the concepts of intention, motive, and 
reason, etc., to discharge their explanatory role, thus throwing into question the whole idea that this 
explanatory role is causal (Tanney, 2009, xx). 
But as I argue above, it’s not clear that Ryle’s argument shows that the explanatory role of motives is not causal 
at all, as opposed to showing merely that their role is not that of a causal trigger. 
18 See for example Martin, 1994 and Bird, 1998. 
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conditional analysis does not work.19	
Moreover, in his treatment of dispositions Ryle says nothing about what is called ‘the 
categorical basis’ or underlying structure of dispositions.20 As we have seen, he insists again 
and again that disposition statements should not be thought of as ‘categorical reports of 
particular but unwitnessable matters of fact’ (117). But, critics have said,  
to speak of an object’s having a dispositional property entails that the object is in some 
non-dispositional state, or that it has some property (there exists a ‘categorial basis’) 
which is responsible for the object manifesting certain behavior in certain 
circumstances (Armstrong, 1968, 86). 
Whether Armstrong is right that speaking of a disposition entails the existence of a 
‘categorical basis’ seems debatable. For even if we agree with Armstrong that dispositions do 
in fact have categorical bases, and that such categorical bases are causally responsible for the 
manifestation of the disposition, we need not agree that that is implied by talk of dispositions. 
Indeed the fact that it is controversial whether all dispositions do in fact have a categorical 
basis surely suggests that talk about dispositions is not implicitly talk about non-dispositional 
properties or states.21 Furthermore, some philosophers who claim that dispositions do 
invariably have categorical bases also claim that dispositions play no causal role in their 
manifestation, since (i) this causal role is played by a disposition’s categorical basis, and (ii) 
dispositions are distinct from their categorical bases.22 If this view about the causal role of 
dispositions turned out to be right, then Ryle’s claim that explanations by reference to 
dispositions are not themselves causal would gain plausibility, even if it does not undermine 
the suggestion that a dispositional explanation of an event implies the possibility of supplying 
a corresponding causal explanation referring to underlying structures and trigger events. 
These issues about the logic of dispositional statements, the nature of dispositions and the 
relation between them and their categorical bases (if any), as well as between dispositions and 
the causal powers of the objects whose dispositions they are, are complex and have been 
much debated recently.23 It is not my aim here to make a contribution to those debates 
because the focus of my paper is to clarify Ryle’s understanding of explanations of actions by 
motives. And, although Ryle says that motives are dispositions, as I indicated in section 1, I 
believe that he was wrong to say this. So I shall leave here the issue whether Ryle was right 
that in general an explanation by reference to a disposition is not a causal explanation and 
turn instead, in the last section of this paper, to the more specific question of what Ryle says 
about explanations of action by reference to motives and character traits, respectively, when 
the two are properly distinguished.   
 
 
3. Motives, Character Traits and the Explanation of Action 																																																								
19 Mumford, 1998. 
20 For criticisms of this aspect of Ryle’s view of dispositions see Armstrong, 1968, and Lyons 1980. 
21 On this see McKitrick, 2003 and Mumford, 2006.  
22 See Prior, Pargetter and Jackson, who characterise categorical (or ‘causal’) bases as follows: 
By a ‘causal basis’ we mean the property or property-complex of the object that, together with the first 
member of the pair –the antecedent circumstances– is the causally operative sufficient condition for the 
manifestation in the case of ‘surefire’ dispositions, and in the case of probabilistic dispositions is 
causally sufficient for the relevant chance of the manifestation (1982, 251). 
See McKitrick, 2004, for a critical discussion of negative views about the causal relevance of dispositions. 
23 For a summary see Cross, 2012. 
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Consider the following passage, which is representative of many contemporary discussions of 
dispositions: 
Disposition terms, such as ‘cowardice’, ‘fragility’ and ‘reactivity,’ often appear in 
explanations. Sometimes we explain why a man ran away by saying that he was 
cowardly, or we explain why something broke by saying it was fragile. Scientific 
explanations of certain phenomena feature dispositional properties like instability, 
reactivity, and conductivity. (McKitrick, 2004, 110. My italics). 
The statement ‘The man ran away because he was cowardly’ could be taken as either of the 
two types of explanation mentioned in section 1: one that simply imputes a motive to the 
person on that occasion: (i) ‘He ran away out of cowardice’; and one that in addition imputes 
the corresponding character trait: (ii) ‘He ran away because he is a coward’. Now, it may be 
that both explanations involve reference to dispositions but if so, the dispositions in question 
would seem to be importantly different, because only the second involves a general 
disposition to have cowardly thoughts and feelings and to behave in cowardly ways. I shall 
start by examining this second type of explanation.  
First, it seems that, as this passage suggests, explanations by reference to character traits are 
indeed explanations by reference to dispositions. For to say that someone’s action was a 
manifestation of a character trait is to say that it is a manifestation of a disposition the person 
has to think and feel and behave in certain ways: in the case of cowardice, a disposition inter 
alia to avoid danger or pain (physical or mental) when it behoves the person to face the 
danger or pain – either because the latter were not severe, or because it was the person’s duty 
to face them, regardless of their severity.   
But although it is plausible that we explain both human action and the behaviour of inanimate 
things by reference to their dispositions, it is also plausible that (at least some of) the relevant 
dispositions should be different in important respects in each of those domains. Indeed, the 
concept of disposition at issue in each case may be quite different – after all, the term 
‘disposition’ as encountered in recent philosophical literature is something of a term of art. I 
shall not here try to give anything like a detailed account of the differences. I shall, however, 
highlight some distinctive features of explanations of human behaviour by reference to 
dispositions that are character traits, such as that found in construal (ii) of the example in the 
passage above, and at the same time comment on what Ryle says about them (once this is 
separated from what he says about motives in general). 
An explanation such as ‘He ran away because he is a coward’ seems to be what Ryle calls a 
‘semi-hypothetical’ or ‘mongrel categorical statement’, which he says is ‘just as much an 
explanatory report of an actual occurrence as a conditional prediction of further occurrences’ 
(141). These mongrel categorical statements describe what the object or person is actually 
doing in a way that is, as he puts it, ‘law impregnated’ (142): it makes it reasonable to expect, 
and allows us so predict, similar behaviour in relevantly similar circumstances. And Ryle says 
that such statements explain the action by placing it in a familiar pattern (that associated with 
the character trait) and sanction predictions about future behaviour in similar circumstances 
on the basis of a past regularity. And he adds  
Statements of this type are not peculiar to descriptions of the higher level actions and 
reactions of people. When a sugar-lump is described as dissolving, something more 
episodic is being said than when it is described as soluble; but something more 
dispositional is being said than when it is described as moist (141-2). 
That all seems right. But statements of this kind involving character traits seem to have other 
distinctive features. 
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First, character trait dispositions are what I shall call ‘manifestation-dependent dispositions’: 
dispositions that are attributed to the individual on the basis of the manifestation of the 
disposition. In the case of character traits, they are attributed on the basis of the fact that, in 
the relevant circumstances, the person to which they are attributed tends to behave, or tends to 
react emotionally, and have thoughts, etc. which are characteristic of the character trait. And 
this dependence of attribution on behaviour or reaction, etc. is not merely epistemic but is, 
rather, constitutive. Frequent or regular relevant behaviour or related thoughts, feelings, etc. 
in the relevant circumstances is constitutive of what it is to have the corresponding character 
trait. 
So someone who tends to behave in a cowardly manner, that is, often or regularly behaves 
cowardly when facing danger, has the character trait of cowardice and the trait is attributed on 
the basis of that regularity of behaviour. But note that it is not necessary that someone 
actually behaves in a cowardly manner regularly, and that is why I say tends to having 
feelings, emotional reactions, in the relevant circumstances as well as ‘regularly behaves’. For 
a character trait may be attributed to someone in spite of the fact that the person does not 
actually behave in the relevant manner if, for example, the person has the relevant reactions 
and is inclined to act in the relevant manner but she does not, because the behaviour is 
supressed by forces external to the agent: that is by others or by circumstances. So, consider, 
for instance, someone who, in the relevant circumstances, feels the inclination to run away or 
eat excessively but is not allowed, or does not have the opportunity, to do so. This person is 
cowardly or greedy (that is, has those dispositions) because he regularly or frequently feels 
the inclination to do so – even though he does not often behave (perhaps even never behaves) 
in the relevant manner. So it may be enough that a person regularly or frequently has certain 
behavioural inclinations, emotional reactions, mental life, etc. for them to have this 
disposition even if they don’t act in the associated manner. In other words, such a disposition 
may be attributed on the basis of regular actual behaviour and/or of regular manifestation of 
the tendency to such behaviour and thoughts and emotional reactions typical of the character 
trait. However, in the absence of either the behaviour or the inclination, etc., a person cannot 
be said to have the disposition: someone who never behaves, nor has the inclination to behave 
in the relevant way, nor has the relevant emotions, thoughts, etc., does not have the relevant 
disposition, that is, the character trait. 
I already anticipated this point in section 1, when I said that the attribution of a character trait 
to a person is conceptually dependent on the attribution of the corresponding motive to the 
person a sufficient number of times. That is, no person is generous who has never been 
motivated by generosity, or cowardly if she has not been motivated by cowardice. I am now 
refining that point by pointing out that a person may have a character trait even if she doesn’t 
display the relevant behaviour so long as she regularly has the relevant feelings, thoughts, 
emotions, etc.  
Dispositions such as character traits are, in that sense, different from say, dispositions like 
fragility which can be attributed to an object despite the object’s never manifesting the 
disposition in any way: that is, never either breaking or otherwise manifesting the disposition. 
These dispositions may be attributed on the basis of knowledge of the kind an object is or the 
stuff it is made of, and may be so attributed even if they are never manifested by the particular 
object, and even if they are not manifested when the trigger conditions for the disposition 
obtain (or so it seems, since, as many have argued, dispositions can be finked or masked).24 																																																								
24 Thus, Cross says: 	
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But this is not true of character traits. 
Note however that, while frequently or regularly behaving in the relevant manner is sufficient 
for the attribution of the character trait (i.e. the disposition), frequently or regularly having the 
inclination etc. to behave in that manner is not sufficient for the person to have the character 
trait.25 A person who has the inclination to behave in the relevant way and has the associated 
thoughts, emotions, etc. but who does not actually behave thus may not have the disposition if 
the reason for the absence of the associated behaviour is the agent herself. Thus, it is possible 
for someone to have a tendency to cowardice and yet not be cowardly if she has the tendency 
to behave in a cowardly manner, and has the associated emotional reactions, mental life, etc. 
but she does not allow such inclinations to prevail: she herself checks those inclinations. So 
someone who is inclined to act cowardly but stands firm in the face of fear and the inclination 
to run away, dismisses the associated thoughts and images, does not allow the emotional 
reactions to determine how she acts, etc. is not a cowardly person, although she has the same 
inclinations as a cowardly person does.26 Such as person does not have the character trait, 
though they may have a disposition to having the character trait.  
This suggests that although what Ryle says about the predictive power of these dispositional 
statements is right, it does not exhaust their explanatory power, for the attribution of a 
character trait to the agent, which underlies the licence to the predictions etc. Ryle talks about, 
appears to add at least one more element to his regularity claims: it brings with it the idea that 
a person with such a disposition is such that certain forms of behaviour are easier for her, i.e. 
they require less effort of will etc., than the contrary behaviour (if the disposition is a vice) or 
than it would be without the disposition (if the latter is a virtue):27 a mean person finds it 
easier to behave meanly than not to do so, just as a methodical person finds it easier to do 
things in a methodical way than a chaotic person.28 And, consequently, suppressing the 
corresponding behaviour (in the case of a vice) requires some kind of effort and attention, and 
engaging in the corresponding behaviour (in the case of virtue) requires less effort than if one 
does not have the disposition.  
This feature of character traits is related to the fact that the agent whose traits they are can 
check them and can (try to) change them by acting or trying to act on particular occasions 
contrary to the inclination concomitant to the character trait.29 And if the effort is successful, 
the disposition may be weakened, lost and even reversed: one may gain the opposite 																																																																																																																																																																													
It’s important to note that neither the activation conditions nor the manifestation conditions need ever 
actually occur in order for an object to have the disposition in question, and this lends dispositions their 
“suspicious” quality, for they seem to be inherently modal; they are by nature about the merely possible 
(2005, 322). 
Though he talks about this is true of all dispositions, I do not think this is right for things such as character traits. 
25 To have a disposition to be mean or noisy is not the same as being mean or noisy: the former is a kind of 
second-order disposition. 
26 The difference between the person who has the character trait of say, cowardice, the person who has the 
tendency to cowardice but not the character trait, and the person who has the opposite character trait, namely 
courage, seem to correspond to the difference between the vicious, the continent, and the virtuous agents drawn 
by Aristotle. 
27 See Kenny, 1989, 85. ‘Effort of will’ is my term not Kenny’s and it is meant to have its ordinary meaning 
here. 
28 And this seems to be a difference between a person who endeavours and (frequently) succeeds to behave 
according to a virtue but does not have the virtue (Aristotle’s ‘continent man’ enkratês) and a person who does 
have it (the virtuous person): only the latter finds it easier to act in a virtuous manner than not to do so. And the 
same seems true of vices. 
29 I do not mean to say that an agent’s choices is the only way in which such dispositions may be changed: there 
are many other ways, such as drills, physiological changes, etc. 
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disposition. For instance, an untidy person may gain the disposition to tidiness, and an 
irascible person may become more mellow.30 
Whether dispositions that are character traits should be thought of as the causes of acts that 
are their manifestations is, then, a point that seems to depend on the notion of cause one is 
operating with. Character traits are certainly not causes in the sense of being occurrences that 
trigger behaviour; but they are, we have seen, more than terms that denote regularities of 
behaviour: they seem, pace Ryle, to be causes in the sense of being conditions that involve a 
tendency or inclination to certain forms of behaviour, emotional reactions, etc. On the other 
hand, if they are causal conditions, they seem to be importantly different from causal 
conditions for the occurrence of events that don’t involve human actions, for whether the 
occurrence (action, etc.) for which they are conditions comes about seems to be, at least in 
some cases, up to the agent, even when the triggering conditions obtain (see footnote 32 
below).  
What of the other type of explanation I mentioned at the beginning, which imputes a motive 
to an agent without imputing the corresponding character trait, such as (ii) above?  
I suggested in section 1 that motive explanations bring an agent’s reasons, aims and actions 
under a familiar pattern in a way that makes the action intelligible. Something like this idea is 
in fact to be found in The Concept of Mind, in, for example, the following passage: 
The two statements ‘the bird is flying south’ and ‘the bird is migrating’ are both 
episodic reports. The question ‘Why is the bird flying south?’ could be answered quite 
properly by saying ‘Because it is migrating’. Yet the process of migrating is not a 
different process from that of flying south; so it is not the cause of the bird’s flying 
south. Nor, since it reports an episode, does the sentence ‘because it is migrating’ say 
the same sort of thing as is said in ‘because it is a migrant’ (142). 
In a similar way we might say that to explain why John ran away by saying that he was being 
cowardly, or that Jill betrayed James because she was avenging the humiliation of her father, 
we are explaining an episode (running way, betraying) by re-describing it as an episode of 
another kind (cowardice, revenge). In other words, explanations by motives are, effectively, 
explanations by re-description. That is why Ryle says that the episode reported in the 
explanans (he was being a coward) is not the cause of the one reported in the explanandum 
(he ran away), since these are not distinct episodes but the same episode differently 
described.31  
This, it seems, is consistent with Davidson’s claim that explanations by motives point to, or 
imply, explanations by reasons and goals, or as he would put it, beliefs and desires, and that 
such explanations are causal in the ways he suggested in ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’. 
Whether Davidson is right about that is an issue that has been hotly debated for decades and it 
is interesting to note that opposition to that view of Davidson’s has been growing in the 
twenty-first century. With that in mind, consider this passage of Ryle’s: 
we are perfectly familiar with the sorts of happenings which induce or occasion people 																																																								
30 The extent of, and limits to, the possibility for changing one’s character traits is a complex issue well beyond 
the scope of this discussion. 
31 This presumably is the passage Davidson had in mind when he says that the logical connection argument, in 
one of its forms, was inspired by Ryle’s treatment of motives in the Concept of Mind. If so, it should be noted 
that Ryle’s argument is not that the alleged cause and effect are not ‘logically distinct’ so they cannot be causally 
connected: his point is that they are not ontologically distinct as they are the same event or process differently 
described, and so could not be related as cause and effect. 
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to do things. If we were not, we could not get them to do what we wish, and the 
ordinary dealings between people could not exist. Customers could not purchase, 
officers could not command, friends could not converse, or children play, unless they 
knew how to get other people and themselves to do things at particular junctures 
(114).  
This seems just another passage where Ryle accepts that actions can have ‘triggering’ events 
as causes. But it should be noted that the view Ryle expresses in this passage is consistent 
with the thought that the word ‘cause’ used to identified a triggering event given certain 
dispositions in people, though rightly applied there as is in cases of inanimate occurrences, 
has importantly different connotations in each case. For in the case of human actions, causing 
someone to act is often persuading, requesting, commanding, etc. them to act, while causing 
an inanimate object to do something (e.g. explode, bend, break, etc.) is never persuading, 
commanding, etc. it to do it. The reason for this is a central distinction between inanimate and 
human action: namely, that the latter but not the former can be the result of the agent’s 
choice.32 
Be that as it may, it seems that Ryle was right in holding that motive explanations are not 
causal explanations – even if, as Davidson claimed, they imply the existence of related causal 
explanations, and even if some of the reasons Ryle gives in defence of this claim are 
unconvincing because they depend, as I have tried to show, on a mistaken assimilation of 
motives to dispositions such as character traits.  
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32 It is of course a hotly contested issue, at the heart of some aspects of the controversy about the compatibilism 
of freewill and determinism, whether choice can really make the difference that those who advocate a radical 
difference between explanations of human action and those of inanimate phenomena claim it does. That is 
beyond the scope of this paper: the point I am making is that, prima facie, the possibility of choice is a 
distinctive phenomenon characteristic of intentional action. 
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